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DRAWING A LINE BETWEEN DIRECT AND
CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT: THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
TAKE ON A COPYING SERVICE PROVIDER'S
DIRECT LIABILITY IN CARTOON NETWORK V.
CSC HOLDINGS
1. INTRODUCTION
There has been a lack of significant copyright litigation
concerning television time-shifting technology since the Supreme
Court cleared video-cassette recorder ("VCR") manufacturers of
liability in 1984.' The more recent development of set-top digital
video recorders ("DVR"s) as the analogous digital counterparts to
VCRs was met with almost no resistance from film studios and
broadcast networks.2 Major cable television providers now offer
their customers the option of renting a DVR in conjunction with
their cable package.3
The relatively non-contentious story of DVR technology finally
took a turn toward the courts when Cablevision announced its new
Remote Storage Digital Video Recorder ("RS-DVR") service in
2006. 4 The service acts as a virtual DVR, allowing customers to
copy and replay television content to and from equipment in
1. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
2. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect
Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise,
55 UCLA L. REv. 143, 194 (2007). While ReplayTV, an early player in the
DVR market, was challenged for its introduction of commercial-skipping
functionality, the courts never had the chance to weigh in as the feature was
eventually discontinued. Id. at 194-195.
3. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir.
2008).
4. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F.
Supp. 2d 607, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Cartoon Network LP v.
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Cablevision's server rooms rather than by the use of a stand-alone
set-top device in the customers' homes.' In Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., the major movie
studios and broadcast networks 6 sued to enjoin the rollout of the
service in the absence of separately negotiated licenses for
Cablevision's role in copying the copyrighted content with the RS-
DVR.7 Rather than allege contributory infringement, the copyright
owners brought a direct infringement case.8 The case resulted in a
fascinating discussion of several specific infringement claims, and
an injunction in favor of the plaintiffs in the district court.9
However, in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court, and
granted summary judgment in favor of Cablevision. 0
This case note focuses on one of the plaintiffs' three claims of
infringement: the issue of whether the RS-DVR's making of
playback copies constitutes a direct, rather than a contributory,
infringement claim. In answering that question, the determinative
factor is who actually makes the copy under copyright law:
Cablevision's customers or Cablevision itself." The note first lays
out the history of cases that informed the Cartoon Network
decision. It then analyzes the legal implications and specifics of
the Second Circuit's opinion in light of case law and policy
considerations. This note argues that the Second Circuit correctly
developed the framework for a broadly applicable rule to limit
direct liability of copying technology providers, but failed to
establish such a rule by neglecting to fully discuss case law and
ruling only on the facts of the RS-DVR system.
5. Id.
6. The plaintiffs included: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Universal City
Studios, Paramount Pictures, Disney Enterprises, ABC, CBS and NBC. Id. at
609-610.
7. Id. at 609.
8. Id. at618.
9. Id. at 624.
10. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139-40 (2d
Cir. 2008).
11. Id. at 130.
398
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Cablevision's RS-DVR System and the Infringement Claims
In order to fully understand the significance of the case law
relevant to the Cartoon Network decision, an initial explanation of
the RS-DVR system and the plaintiffs' claims is necessary. The
RS-DVR system provides the same basic functionality as an
ordinary, set-top DVR device by allowing subscribing customers
to record and replay television programming, and it is available to
Cablevision customers for an extra service charge on top of their
normal cable bill.12 Both the recording and playback options are
triggered by the customer's use of his or her remote control. 3 A
remote command to record or play is received by the customer's
set-top cable box and then communicated to the RS-DVR system
housed on Cablevision's premises.14 When copying video for a
customer, the system diverts Cablevision's programming stream
from the requested channel to create a playback copy on a partition
of a Cablevision hard drive set aside for each particular
subscribing customer. 5 Instead of limited the number of channels
available, Cablevision chose to make all of its 170 television
channels recordable by RS-DVR customers. 6
The plaintiff broadcasters and producers hold copyrights for
much of the content broadcast to television viewers via
Cablevision's service. 7 They sought to enjoin Cablevision from
rolling out the RS-DVR system without first negotiating separate
licenses for the copying functionality. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that
without separate licenses, the RS-DVR system directly infringed
their copyrights in three ways: (1) the creation of playback copies
violated their right to reproduce their work; (2) temporary buffer
copies used to create the playback copies violated the same right;
12. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
13. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124.
14. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
15. Id. at 615.
16. Id. at 613.
17. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124.
18. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
399
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and (3) the transmissions made when playing. back the copies
violated their right to publicly perform their work. 9 Although the
latter two claims also merit extensive analysis, this note will
discuss the facts and rulings surrounding the playback copy claim.
Regarding the playback copies, Cablevision claimed that the
customer would actually be making the copy, and the cable
provider could not be held liable for direct infringement.2" Thus,
they argued that the claim could only be considered under a
contributory infringement doctrine, and that, under Sony,
Cablevision simply "provid[ed] customers with the machinery to
make copies. ' 2' The plaintiffs forewent a contributory liability
argument, and the parties stipulated to waive any claims of indirect
infringement or fair use.22 Instead, the plaintiffs argued that due to
Cablevision's ownership and control of the RS-DVR system, the
cable company, and not the customer, would actually make the
copies. 23 Because the merit of the claim was based on direct
infringement, the relevant case law does not fall under Sony's
contributory infringement reasoning; rather, appropriate cases
include those that considered whether a copying product or service
provider could be treated as directly infringing.
B. Cases Leading up to Cartoon Network
Two lines of cases before the Cartoon Network decision
considered providers of copying technology and the line between
direct and contributory liability. These cases can be separated into
two general categories: (1) copy shop cases that have weighed the
direct liability of stores at which copyrighted material is copied by
or for customers, and (2) Internet service provider (ISP) cases that
have weighed the direct liability of ISPs and website maintainers
whose equipment hosts copyrighted material uploaded by users.
19. See id. at 617.
20. Id. at617-18.
21. Id. at 618.
22. Id. at 616.
23. Id. at 617.
400
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1. Copy Shop Cases
a. Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services, Inc.
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,
Inc.24 is the leading case in a line of judgments concerning copy
shops that made course packets for college professors.2"
Professors first selected material that they provided to the shop.
The copy shop then assembled the material and re-printed it into
course packets, which were sold directly to students.26 Princeton
University Press involved a copy shop that explicitly refused to
follow the customary practice of requesting permission from
publishers and paying royalties before printing compilations of
copyrighted materials.27 When several publishers sued the shop,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the shop liable for
directly infringing on the copyrights because the shop's use of the
copyrighted materials did not fall under the fair use safe harbor.28
b. Elektra Records v. Gem Electronic Distributors
Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Distributors, Inc.2" held
that a store was the direct infringer when it allowed customers to
use its equipment and reproduce copyrighted works." The store
sold blank 8-track tapes that could be used in their "Make-A-
Tape" copy machine, which allowed customers to copy
commercial, copyrighted tapes from an in-store library.31 Despite
a lack of proof that the store employees participated in operating
24. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996).
25. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir.
2008).
26. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1384.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1383.
29. Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
30. Id. at 825.
31. Id. at 822-23.
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the Make-A-Tape machine, the store was found to be a direct
infringer. 32 The Elektra court stated that whether the store
employees or the customers loaded the tapes into the deck or
pushed the record button was not determinative of direct liability.
The fact that the store profited from the sale of the infringing
tapes, however, did contribute to the finding.33
2. ISP Cases
a. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc.,34 the District Court for the Northern
District of California ruled out direct infringement liability for an
ISP providing server space that was used by a customer to copy
and distribute copyrighted material.35 The Netcom plaintiffs held
copyrights for L. Ron Hubbard books, excerpts from which were
posted to a computer bulletin board (BBS) that was connected to
the Internet through the ISP Netcom.36 The BBS allowed its users
to post material by saving it to its servers, and the service held the
postings for several days, during which time the postings could be
downloaded by other users.3"
The Netcom court granted summary judgment in favor of
Netcom, finding that the ISP did not directly infringe the plaintiff s
copyrights. 8 In coming to its conclusion, the court determined
that there must be "some element of volition or causation" in the
infringing conduct to hold an actor directly liable.39 The court
32. Id. at 823.
33. See id. ("Regardless of the precise role played by defendants' employees,
the above-described operation of Make-A-Tapes clearly evidences their
commercial exploitation by defendants for profit in derogation of the plaintiffs'
rights of exclusive publication.").
34. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
35. Id. at 1373.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1367.
38. Id. at 1373.
39. Id. at 1370.
402 [Vol. XIX:2
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specifically pointed out that Netcom "did not take any affirmative
action that directly resulted in the copying plaintiffs' works",4" and
that there was no "human intervention [by Netcom] beyond the
initial setting up of the system."'" Concluding its ruling, the court
said that "[w]here the infringing subscriber is clearly directly liable
for the same act, it does not make sense" for the owners of the
servers to also be held directly liable.42 Because content passes
through many servers as it travels the Internet, such a rule would
also "lead to the liability of countless parties."'" The large-scale
liability and the massive amount of information passing through
the Internet made such an extension of liability unworkable.4 The
decision thus considered Netcom's lack of an active role in
copying beyond the mere provision of its automated system, the
underlying logic of extending direct liability to multiple parties,
and the policy implications of duplicate liability under conditions
in which such liability would extend to countless individuals.
b. Playboy v. Russ Hardenburgh
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.," a
district court found a BBS maintainer directly liable for infringing
content posted through its system.46 The defendant BBS provided
incentives for its users to upload material, some of which was
copyrighted, by allowing increased download capabilities in
exchange.47 Because many of the uploaded files were "adult"
images, a BBS employee would briefly review each file to ensure
it was not pornographic or blatantly infringing upon a copyright.48
In analyzing the legitimacy of a direct infringement claim, the
40. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
41. Id. at 1369.
42. Id. at 1372.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1372-73 ("Billions of bits of data flow through the Internet and
are necessarily stored on servers throughout the network and it is thus
practically impossible to screen out infringing bits from noninfringing bits.").
45. Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio
1997).
46. Id. at 512.
47. Id. at 506.
48. Id.
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Hardenburgh court first cited Netcom in stating that such liability
requires "some element of direct action or participation. '49 It
based this conclusion on the fact that the Copyright Act is written
in terms of activities, and because the existence of contributory
liability allows a remedy against parties who have not directly
acted or participated in the alleged infringement.5" However, the
court found that the nature of the defendant's role did satisfy such
a standard for direct liability based on two aspects of its conduct:
the defendant encouraged its subscribers to upload files, and the
defendant reviewed all submitted photographs before posting them
on the website.5" The Hardenburgh court thus suggested that a
sufficient volitional action could come in the form of both a brief
human intervention in the actual copying process, or in a more
general way by encouraging infringing conduct on a system
already in place.
c. Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc.52 held that a website
that provided access to unlicensed copyrighted images could not
be held directly liable for infringement."3 Cybernet was an online
service that provided access to member "adult" websites through a
central age verification and payment site. 4  Perfect 10 was a
magazine that sued when its copyrighted images were found on
several of Cybemet's member's websites.5 The Perfect 10 court
relied on Hardenburgh in stating that a service provider must
engage in specific activities in order to directly infringe.56 The
court based its finding against direct infringement liability on two
factors that prevented Cybernet's role from rising to the volitional
level of the Hardenburgh defendant. 7 First, the court noted that
49. Id. at 512.
50. Id. at 512-13.
51. Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 513.
52. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
53. See id. at 1168-69.
54. Id. at 1158.
55. Id. at 1162.
56. Id. at 1168.
57. See id.
404
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Cybernet did not store infringing material on its own hardware."
Second, Cybernet did not move the infringing files from one
location to another. 9 Thus, the Perfect 10 court focused on both a
lack of human intervention in the copying process and the extent
of involvement of the defendant's equipment in the infringing
conduct.
d. CoStar Group. v. Loopnet
In CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc.,6 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit considered the volition requirement for
direct liability provided by the district court in Netcom. The
plaintiff, CoStar, was a national real estate listing service with a
large database of copyrighted photographs of property.6' LoopNet
was an ISP that maintained a website containing thousands of real
estate listings.62 LoopNet's subscribers could upload real estate
listings, including pictures, to the website.63 Before actually
posting the listings, a LoopNet employee briefly checked the
content to ensure it was not obviously copyrighted material.'
CoStar filed its direct infringement suit against LoopNet when
hundreds of its copyrighted photos were discovered on LoopNet's
website.65
CoStar argued that Netcom's broad protection of ISPs was
preempted by the ISP safe harbor provided by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, and thus the earlier case's strong
endorsement of holding the customer as the direct infringer was
not binding precedent.66 The Fourth Circuit not only rejected
CoStar's argument, but also took the opportunity to elaborate on
the meaning of the earlier holding. The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed
the volitional act requirement and stated that the volitional conduct
aspect of direct liability, rather than the avoidance of unlimited
58. Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2dat 1168.
59. Id.
60. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
61. Id. at 546.
62. Id. at 547.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 556.
65. Id. at 547.
66. See CoStar, 373 F.3d at 548.
9
Harman: Drawing a Line between Direct and Contributory Copyright Infringe
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. & IPLAW [Vol. XIX:2
liability, was the crux of the Netcom holding.67 CoStar held that
"automatic copying, storage, and transmission of copyrighted
materials, when instigated by others, does not render an ISP
strictly liable for copyright infringement. ' 68  Therefore, in
determining the necessary volitional action in making copies on an
automated system, the Fourth Circuit focused primarily on what
person triggered the actual copying. Its decision noticeably
minimized the policy factors discussed in Netcom, and ignored the
cursory intervention by the system maintainer in the copying
process, similar to that which was viewed as significant in
Hardenburgh.
C. Cartoon Network in the District and Circuit Courts
The Copyright Act gives a holder of a copyrighted work, inter
alia, the exclusive right to reproduce the work.69 As the parties in
Cartoon Network agreed in lower court proceedings that a work is
reproduced in the making of a playback copy,7" the central
question in determining liability was who copied the work: the
customer or Cablevision?71 "If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs' theory
of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs'
theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most,
secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by
plaintiffs."72
67. See id. at 549 ("While the court in Netcom did point out the dramatic
consequences... the court grounded its ruling principally on its interpretation
of § 106 of the Copyright Act as implying a requirement of 'volition or
causation."').
68. Id. at 555.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
70. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F.
Supp. 2d 607, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Cartoon Network LP v.
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
71. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 ("[T]he core of the dispute is over
the authorship of the infringing conduct."); Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F.
Supp. 2d at 617 ("[T]he question is who makes the copies.").
72. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130.
406
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1. District Court - Twentieth Century Fox v. Cablevision
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
pointed to the complexity of the RS-DVR system and the "ongoing
relationship between Cablevision and its customers" in ruling that
Cablevision was directly liable for copyright infringement.73 In its
analysis, the district court distinguished the RS-DVR from the
VCRs that were the subject of contributory liability analysis in
Sony.74 Highlighting the VCR's design as a stand-alone piece of
equipment,75 the complexity of the RS-DVR system,76 the ongoing
service required for the system to function,77 and the selection by
Cablevision of which channels may be recorded,78 the district court
found that the RS-DVR was less similar to a VCR or set-top DVR
than to Cablevision's Video on Demand (VOD) service.79 Noting
that the RS-DVR was based on the VOD system, which
Cablevision already used in conjunction with purchased licenses,
the district court declared that the system was more akin to a copy
service than to a time-shifting device covered by the Sony ruling.8"
The district court next compared the plaintiffs' claim to the
direct infringement claim in Princeton University Press.8 In
drawing this analogy, the court stated that "Cablevision, through
its RS-DVR, would not merely house copying machinery on its
premises for customers to engage in copying. 2 Rather it would be
'doing' the copying, notwithstanding that the copying would be
done at the customer's behest."83
73. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
74. Id. at 618 ("[A]part from their time-shifting functions, the RS-DVR and
the VCR have little in common.").
75. Id.
76. Id. ("The various computers and devices owned and operated by
Cablevision ... are needed to produce a recording.").
77. Id.
78. Id. at 619 ("Cablevision ... would also decide which programming
channels to make available for recording.").
79. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
80. See id. ("[T]he RS-DVR bears a striking resemblance to VOD-a service
that Cablevision provides pursuant to licenses negotiated with programming
owners.").
81. Id. at 620.
82. Id.
83. Id.
407
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Finally, the district court discussed the applicability of the
Netcom case on the direct infringement question.84  It limited
Netcom's specific holding to ISPs due to the "unique attributes of
the internet" which influenced the decision.85 The court
distinguished the situations of the defendants in the two cases by
contrasting the "free flow of information that takes place on the
Internet" to Cablevision's "unfettered discretion" in its selection of
programming." The district court concluded that copies made by
the RS-DVR were actually made by Cablevision.87 It also ruled
for the plaintiffs on the other two infringement claims, resulting in
summary judgment.88
The district court's decision on sufficient volitional action
focused on the degree of Cablevision's involvement in the copying
process, rather than on a final triggering act by the customer. In
considering the facts, the district court treated the relationship
between Cablevision and customer as fundamentally different than
that of a general ISP or BBS operator based on its involvement in
the RS-DVR maintenance and its control over the content copied.
2. Second Circuit - Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
ruling on all three claims and granted summary judgment in favor
of Cablevision.89 Regarding the direct infringement claim for the
playback copies, the Second Circuit's decision stressed the Netcom
concept of volition in determining that Cablevision's customers,
rather than the company itself, would actually be making the
copies."° The Second Circuit first reasoned that Netcom and
CoStar called for direct liability to be based on a discrete,
volitional act.9' It found the requisite element of volition in "the
84. Id.
85. Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
86. Id.
87. Id. at621.
88. Id. at 621-24.
89. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir.
2008).
90. See id. at 131-33.
91. In so doing, the court argued that Netcom's conclusion was not dependent
on its specific role as an ISP. See id. at 131 ("Like the Fourth Circuit, we reject
408
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person who actually presses the button to make the recording. ' '92
The Second Circuit directly contradicted the analogies and
distinctions drawn by the district court. According to the Second
Circuit, the RS-DVR is more similar to a VCR or a standard copy
shop than it is to VOD or the copy shop in Princeton University
Press.9' The opinion went on to criticize the district court's
consideration of continuing relationship, instrumentality, and
control, which it argued were relevant to contributory, but not
direct, infringement.94 The Second Circuit reversed the district
court, and granted summary judgment in favor of Cablevision.95
III. ANALYSIS
Throughout its analysis, the Second Circuit adopted the
interpretation of Netcom and CoStar that suggested a general rule,
clearing providers of automated copying systems from direct
liability claims when the users of such systems triggered the
making of the infringing copies. The conclusions that the Second
Circuit drew in its analysis clearly endorse such a rule, and directly
contradict the district court's reasoning that a high level of
involvement can establish the element of volition necessary to
maintain a direct infringement claim. Rather than explicitly ruling
out any consideration of the degree of a service provider's
involvement, the Second Circuit ended its decision by refusing to
rule on the relevance of the involvement factor, and instead,
indicated that conflicting case law on the issue would remain
unresolved. Had the Second Circuit more thoroughly discussed
the case law, it could have shown that its decision did not
materially conflict with any significant precedents.
The Cartoon Network decision first extended Netcom's and
CoStar's conclusions to the RS-DVR system, suggesting a
the contention that 'the Netcom decision was driven by expedience."').
92. Id.
93. See id. at 131-132.
94. Id. at 132 ("Cablevision's 'continuing relationship' with the RS-DVR
customers, its control over recordable content, and the 'instrumental[ity]' of the
copying to the RS-DVR system seem to us more relevant to the question of
contributory liability.") (citation omitted).
95. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 133.
13
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uniform, broadly applicable rule for providers of copying
technologies.96  Second, the Second Circuit discussed, and
dismissed, consideration of some of the factors that the district
court found determinative of direct liability.97 Next, the opinion
reflected on the desirability of dealing with similar cases using
contributory, rather than direct, infringement theory.98 Finally, the
Second Circuit limited its ruling to the facts of the case, failing to
affirmatively set forth the uniform rule it argued for throughout its
opinion.99 The following analysis will discuss these four segments
of the opinion in turn, contemplating the validity and implications
of the Second Circuit's conclusions.
A. Expansion of Netcom and CoStar to a Broader, More Uniform
Rule
The Second Circuit began its discussion of Cablevision's
potential direct liability by invoking the volitional action
requirement applied in Netcom.' °  The analysis interpreted
Netcom's decision as a general rule, applicable when infringing
copies are made on a system owned by one party and triggered by
another. 11 The Second Circuit concluded that under Netcom's
reasoning, the only actor involved in the RS-DVR process that
may be viewed as making the copy in a method sufficient for
direct liability is the user who pushes the record button on its
remote control.102 The acceptance of this general rule depended on
a different interpretation of the extent of Netcom's holding than
that relied upon by the district court and in some prior cases.
96. See id. at 131.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 133.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 130.
101. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130-131 ("'[S]omething more must
be shown than mere ownership of a machine to make illegal copies."' (quoting
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004))).
102. Id. at 131 ("Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the volitional
conduct that causes the copy to be made. There are only two instances of
volitional conduct in this case ... designing, housing, and maintaining a system
that exists only to produce a copy, and ... ordering that system to produce a
copy ..").
410
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While all the relevant cases since Netcom have agreed with its
requirement for a volitional element, the decisions on liability in
each case have centered on what type of conduct may satisfy that
element. 13 The district court's focus on the degree of
Cablevision's involvement in the copying process may be
compatible with some of the earlier applications of Netcom, but the
Second Circuit tellingly criticized the lower court for "pigeon-
hol[ing]" the Netcom holding."°  By treating the district court
decision as if it failed to apply Netcom, rather than simply arguing
that it incorrectly analyzed the facts regarding Netcom's volition
element, the Second Circuit clearly interpreted Netcom more
broadly than some earlier cases.
The Hardenburgh, Perfect 10, and district courts read Netcom
merely as requiring a sufficient volitional act by any involved
party to bring about direct liability. Under this method of analysis,
the extent of a copying technology provider's involvement in the
overall copying process could be weighed, and if significant
enough, substituted for the user's volitional act of triggering the
copy. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, interpreted the
principles of Netcom to not only require a volitional act to
establish direct liability, but also to determine that in cases of
automated copying technologies, that volitional act can only be
attributed to the user triggering the copy. The Second Circuit
stated that Netcom's "reasoning and conclusions ... transcend the
Internet..., and we find it 'a particularly rational interpretation of
§ 106,' rather than a special-purpose rule applicable only to
ISPs."'' 5 Thus, the Cartoon Network decision envisions a broadly
applicable rule limiting the parties to whom direct liability can be
assigned when any copying technology is triggered by an end user.
The Second Circuit's vision of a broadly applicable rule has
appealing logical implications. First, it forecloses the possibility
of multiple parties facing direct liability. Even outside the
103. For example, Russ Hardenburgh and Perfect 10 prescribed to follow
Netcom, but considered such factors as the BBS's encouragement of copying
and physical storage of hard drive on which the infringing images were copied.
See supra Part II.B.2.b-c.
104. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131.
105. Id. (quoting CoStar, 373 F.3d at 551) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
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circumstances of the Internet, in which information may pass
through many different servers implicating an unlimited number of
parties, it is better to impose direct infringement liability on a
single individual. If Cablevision's role in the copies made by the
RS-DVR system was judged to satisfy the Netcom standard for
volitional action, it would be difficult to argue that the RS-DVR
user's act of engaging the system to copy a specific copyrighted
program would not also satisfy the standard. Under the strict
liability imposed by the Copyright Act, the situation would result
in two direct infringers. Such a result necessarily takes the focus
off of finding a party who actually made the copy, and instead
punishes multiple individuals that may have various degrees of
culpability.
Furthermore, standardizing a rule for establishing volition across
all copying technologies is desirable. Volition itself is a concept
that should be determined independently of the specific features of
a given technology. A service provider's knowledge of, or interest
in, its customer's specific infringing use of a copying technology
may lead to a greater culpability in a copyright violation." 6 A
greater involvement by the service provider, however, does not
change the nature of an end user's volitional act of triggering the
copy. The following hypothetical illustrates the problem with
allowing a service provider's involvement to alter the overall
determination of volition: consider an arrangement in which an
ISP makes a deal with cable television channels to broadcast
programming feeds to subscribers over the ISP's Internet
connection. Subscribers could use separately purchased utilities to
copy the programming feeds and later post individual copyrighted
programs to the ISP's bulletin board service. Under the district
court's framework for analysis, a determination must first be made
as to whether the facts present an ISP case, or a case more like a
cable provider with RS-DVR. If it is an ISP case, the CoStar ruling
would strongly suggest that only the customer may be directly
liable, regardless of the ISP's role; if more analogous to the RS-
DVR system, the identity of the direct infringer(s) would be
determined by an examination of the extent of the ISP's
106. Such culpability may be punishable under contributory liability. The
advantages to limiting punishment to contributory infringement doctrine are
discussed later. See infra Part III.C.
412
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involvement in its own service. Such a divergent analysis does not
make sense, as the volitional element provided by the end user is
identical under the facts of Netcom, the hypothetical, and Cartoon
Network. Therefore, the Second Circuit's vision of a rule that
establishes not only the requirement for volition in direct
infringement claims, but also a standard for what constitutes that
volition in copying technology situations, is an improvement on
the district court's analysis.
B. Discussion of the District Court's Determinative Factors
After setting out a rule under which it would analyze the
question of direct liability, the Second Circuit turned to a
discussion of specific factors that the district court used in holding
Cablevision liable."°7 Notably, the Second Circuit first rejected an
analogy to Princeton University Press, and then discounted the
district court's emphasis on Cablevision's control over the content
that the RS-DVR could copy.0 8 The analysis of these arguments
not only dismissed the district court's conclusion on the specific
facts of the RS-DVR situation, but also diminished the importance
of cases that appear to conflict with the Second Circuit's broad
reading of Netcom.
1. The Significance of Human Intervention as a Triggering Act
The Second Circuit criticized the district court's reliance on
Princeton University Press."9 The district court analogized the
two fact patterns, claiming that in each, the service providing
defendants were the parties making the copies, though it was "at
the customer's behest.""'  Discrediting the analogy, the Second
Circuit pointed to the element of human intervention. In Princeton
University Press, the defendant actually took the copy request
from the customer and then processed the packets himself.
107. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131-132.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 131.
110. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F.
Supp. 2d 607, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Cartoon Network LP v.
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Cablevision customers, on the other hand, input their record
commands directly into the automated RS-DVR system. "'
The human intervention by the defendant in Princeton
University Press clearly distinguishes the case under the Second
Circuit's reading of Netcom, which pins direct liability on the
single actor who triggered the copy. Although the Cartoon
Network decision does not relate other case law to the topic, the
distinction of human intervention also presents interesting
questions about prior cases that appear to conflict with the Second
Circuit's reading of Netcom. While the Hardenburgh court clearly
proposed the analysis of more factors in determining sufficient
volition than did the Cartoon Network court, the first of the two
factors it found determinative of direct liability was the human
intervention by the defendant's employees: triggering the post of
the copyrighted images.112 Viewed in light of the Second Circuit
framework, such a factor seems more relevant to defining a
triggering act than it does to measuring the service provider's
involvement in the copying process. The second decisive factor
that the Hardenburgh court pointed to was the fact that the service
provider encouraged its users to upload the infringing material.'13
This aspect of the defendant's role may now more clearly fall
under the contributory liability doctrine of inducement,"' leaving
the remainder of the Hardenburgh decision less distinguishable
from that of the Second Circuit. Despite the fact that both
decisions use different forms of analysis, reflection on
Hardenburgh and Cartoon Network in terms of human
intervention minimizes the extent to which the decisions actually
conflict.
Perfect 10 was the only other case decided since Netcom that
suggested consideration of a service provider's involvement in the
copying process when a user triggers an infringing copy. The
Perfect 10 court similarly used human intervention as a
determinative factor in assigning direct liability, though it used the
111. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131-32.
112. Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 513 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
113. Id.
114. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
919 (2005).
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lack of intervention to support a lack of liability." 5 Also, pointing
to the fact that its defendant did not own the servers storing the
infringing images, the Perfect 10 analysis considered factors that
the Second Circuit framework deemed irrelevant." 6 However, as
the Perfect 10 court discussed this issue to show a lack of
volitional action, it did not suggest that a change in this fact alone
would alter its decision on liability." 7 Therefore, though Perfect
10's analysis did not completely square with the framework
utilized by the Second Circuit, the holdings of the two cases do not
directly conflict.
The Second Circuit's rejection of the Princeton analogy is easily
explained by its focus on the need for a single, triggering act.
Consideration of this triggering act being established by a human
intervention raises questions as to how incompatible the
Hardenburgh and Perfect 10 rationales really are with the Second
Circuit's interpretation of Netcom. It is noteworthy that the CoStar
court chose to dismiss consideration of its defendant's intervention
in the copying process." 8 The RS-DVR system does not require
any intervention similar to that of CoStar, Hardenburgh, or
Princeton University Press, and thus the Second Circuit did not
discuss the issue of determining what type of intervention would
suffice to become a triggering act. The Second Circuit's emphasis
on a triggering act, however, naturally magnifies the importance of
any human intervention, and simultaneously provides a different
framework for viewing the earlier decisions.
2. Content Control as a Potential Factor to Volition
The Second Circuit next dismissed the weight that the district
court gave to Cablevision's control over the copyrighted content
that the RS-DVR can record."9 Admitting that a degree of control
over the content makes Cablevision "more proximate" in the
115. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1168
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1168-1169.
118. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir. 2004).
119. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir.
2008).
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copying process, the Second Circuit reasoned that the limited role
was not "sufficiently proximate to the copying to displace the
customer as the person who 'makes' the copies." 120 While the
Second Circuit's wording did not explicitly foreclose the
consideration of content control in any instance, it went on to hint
at what degree of content control would be necessary to remove a
service provider from general immunity and into the realm of
direct liability. Rather than continuous streams of programming in
the form of television channels, the Second Circuit indicated that a
potential for direct liability would require control over the
availability and timing of individual copyrighted programs.1 2'
Thus the Second Circuit implies that the general protection from
liability exists for service providers as long as they do not control
the specific copyrighted works that their customers may copy.
There is little case law contradicting the Second Circuit's
decision not to consider Cablevision's control over the channels
available to the RS-DVR. The main precedent case supporting
consideration of content control in assigning direct liability to a
service provider is Elektra Records. The Elektra Records court
focused on the provision of copyrighted music by the store to its
customers, but it would be inappropriate for the Second Circuit to
consider Elektra Records as authority towards a different
conclusion. 122 First, the store in Elektra Records made the tapes
of individual copyrighted works available, which goes beyond the
scope of the Second Circuit's ruling.1 23  Second, the Elektra
Records court did not specifically assert that the store's control of
the content was a determinative factor of analysis.'24 In fact, a
footnote in the opinion suggests that there was evidence that store
employees may have participated in the actual operation of the
copying device. 125 Such evidence could have persuaded the
120. Id.
121. See id. ("But this control is limited to the channels of programming
available to a customer and not to the programs themselves. Cablevision has no
control over what programs are made available on individual channels or when
those programs will air, if at all.").
122. See Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821,
823 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 822 n.3 ("Plaintiffs affidavits aver that defendants' employees
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Elektra Records court to consider other factors with less stringency
than they otherwise would have. Finally, Elektra Records has
since been criticized for considering the provision of content in a
direct, rather than contributory infringement claim.16 Therefore,
there is no strong precedent that contradicts the Second Circuit's
reasoning, which excluded the consideration of content control in
similar cases.
C. Argument for a Meaningful Distinction Between Direct and
Contributory Liability
After explaining its framework for analysis and specific
rationale, the Second Circuit supported its conclusions by pointing
to its interpretation of the Supreme Court and Congress's intent in
the treatment of different categories of infringement. 127  The
Second Circuit suggested that both authorities express a "desire to
maintain a meaningful distinction between direct and contributory
copyright infringement."'' 28  The Second Circuit argued that the
Supreme Court's modes of analysis in Sony and other cases
"strongly signaled its intent to use contributory infringement
doctrine, not direct infringement" to address cases in which
liability is imposed on one individual after another makes a
copy. 121 It further argues that a similar desire on the part of
Congress is evident in the fact that the Patent Act includes a
statutory assignment of liability on a party who induces
infringement, while the Copyright Act noticeably does not. 3 '
Weighing Cablevision's involvement in maintaining the RS-DVR
. . . extract the tapes after duplication, and test the newly recorded tape for
fidelity before delivery to the customer.").
126. See, e.g., RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("It is true that . . . the defendant in Elektra provided the
originals as well as the machine for copying, but this distinction is of no import
under these circumstances. The significant element of a copyright violation is
the copying. . . . Supplying the original creates a more egregious case of
contributory infringement....").
127. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir.
2008).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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system and its control over the copyrighted content, the district
court examined factors that are normally addressed by contributory
infringement.' Thus, by adopting a general rule that does not
weigh factors of involvement, the Second Circuit took a step
toward distinguishing the two forms of liability.
Whether or not the Second Circuit's conclusion about Supreme
Court and Congressional intent are correct, the goal of more
clearly distinguishing contributory liability from direct liability is a
valid one. First of all, a clear distinction provides a measure of
predictability and certainty to both providers of copying
technologies and copyright holders alike. While the same cases
will still present potentially complex analyses under the
contributory infringement doctrine, the elimination of direct
liability consideration from a large number of fact patterns would
at least provide potential litigants with a single doctrine on which
to focus.
Second, a rule that clearly directs a single form of liability for all
providers of emerging copying technologies allows for the
application of the most "up-to-date" laws to the changing
landscape of media. Copyright cases involving specific copying
products, services, or systems necessarily respond to unique
factual situations that will often be created by the evolution of
technology. Designating a single doctrine under which to consider
all such cases would keep the law under that doctrine more current
in terms of new technologies. Cartoon Network is a good example
in that the plaintiffs seem to be avoiding the implications of the
Sony ruling by using a direct, as opposed to contributory,
infringement claim.'32 Sony fails to give adequate protection to
copyright holders in light of modem technologies, though, it would
best serve the body of law to reform contributory infringement
doctrine rather than to leave it static. By creating a clear
131. Id. at 132.
132. See Steven Seidenberg, Recording Restrictions, INSIDE COUNSEL, Dec.
1, 2008, at 20, available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2008/December%202008/Pages/Recordin
g-Restrictions.aspx ("The likely reason [why the plaintiffs made no contributory
infringement claim], according to many experts, is that the plaintiffs were trying
to get around the Supreme Court's seminal ruling in Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.").
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distinction between the use of direct and contributory
infringement, courts can best attain a single, consistent, and up-to-
date body of case law through which copyright holders can enforce
their rights.
D. Holding on the Facts of the Case
After laying out the framework for a broad and helpful rule, the
Second Circuit diminished the strength of its own holding by
ruling only on the facts of the RS-DVR system. In concluding its
analysis of the direct infringement claim, the Second Circuit
surmised that the district court followed a line of cases that allow a
critical mass of involvement by a service provider to substitute for
the volitional element required by Netcom.'33 Instead of rejecting
the district court's mode of analysis in favor of the broad rule that
the Second Circuit claimed to endorse at the beginning of its
opinion, it abstained from ruling on whether a service provider
could be deemed directly liable for infringement based on
involvement with the copying process alone.'34  The opinion
concluded only that "based on the facts of this case, copies
produced by the RS-DVR system are 'made' by the RS-DVR
customer, and Cablevision's contribution to this reproduction by
providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct
liability."'35  The Second Circuit's limitation of its holding is
puzzling because its earlier analysis laid out the framework for a
clear, broadly applicable rule.
The Second Circuit also does readers a disservice by leaving the
relevance of a service provider's involvement as an open question.
By specifically mentioning the existence of conflicting case law,
yet refusing to rule on the issue, the Cartoon Network opinion
leaves the impression that the there is an active debate over the
subject.'36 Rather than refusing to enter the debate, the Second
Circuit could have discussed the reasoning behind the earlier
133. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 133.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The Second Circuit specifically cites Hardenburgh as conflicting in
regard to using involvement by the service provider to establish a volitional
element, but notes that the earlier case is not binding precedent. Id.
419
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decisions. Such an endeavor would only serve to bolster the
Cartoon Network analysis by showing a lack of strongly
conflicting authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
The early discussion of Netcom suggested that direct copyright
infringement liability should generally not be considered for
providers of automated copying technologies when a user of that
technology is ultimately responsible for triggering the infringing
copy. The discussion of particular aspects of the case limited
exceptions to the rule to rather understandable situations. First, the
immunity from liability may not be appropriate if the service
provider engages in a volitional act after the user orders a copy to
be made. This could, in effect, supersede the user's volition and
establish the service provider as the one who actually makes the
infringing copy. Second, the rule may not apply if the service
provider, rather than the user, selects the individual copyrighted
works to be copied. While the exceptions may arise in future
cases, requiring more intricate analysis, the general rule is based
on sound principles and would eliminate the need for analyzing
ambiguous situations under a doctrine not developed for the task.
Cartoon Network's insightful analysis of the line between direct
and contributory infringement claims will likely provide solid
guidance to courts pondering the question of direct versus
contributory liability for automated copying technologies. While
the Second Circuit ruled correctly on the facts of the case, it is
unfortunate that it did not base its holding on the framework built
over the course of its opinion. By holding only on the facts of the
RS-DVR system, the Cartoon Network decision failed to foreclose
direct infringement claims against mere providers of copying
technology.
Jesse Harman
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